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Introduction 
A state official once asked Confucius (551–479 BCE) about whether to kill all the wicked 
people in his domain. The sage replied, ‘Just desire the good yourself and the common people 
will be good. By nature the gentleman [junzi] is like wind and the small man [xiaoren] like 
grass. Let the wind sweep over the grass and it is sure to bend.’1 Confucius believed that 
morality is not limited to the private life but also has public implications. In context, he was 
teaching that the cultivation of a ruler’s moral character would result in a good and 
harmonious society. Yet it was not only rulers who were to transform themselves and the 
society around them. Confucius also believed that everybody could pursue perfection and 
ultimately become a superior person (junzi). 
When we consider Christianity, we know that the greatest commandments are to love 
God and to love one’s neighbour. But are these commands limited to ‘spiritual’ matters? In 
Western contexts, many debate whether Christianity should be considered a private religion 
or whether it could have a public voice, engaging issues of common interest to the wider 
society. In China, this becomes even more complex given that Christianity is often seen as a 
minor foreign religion in a socialist state. Moreover, the public face of Chinese Christianity 
can be seen to be at odds with the interests of Chinese governing authorities. 
In fact, neither Christianity nor Confucianism can be fully constrained by rigid modern 
categories such as ‘public’ or ‘private’ realms. The multiplicity of the practices, beliefs, and 
experiences associated with any tradition tend to blur the boundaries and assume natural 
                                                 
1 Analects 12: 19. Translated in D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects (Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press, 2000), 115. 
encroachments into each realm. It is often the case that various internal and external forces 
affect the level of public or private engagement.2 
Early Christianity was a persecuted Jewish sectarian faith and rivalled gnosticism, 
mystery religions, and other religious realities of the broader Graeco-Roman context—not to 
mention the imperial cult. Though some of the teachings of Jesus and his disciples expressed 
concerns related to the society and the state, the emphasis was largely limited to what we 
would today call a private religion. However, Christianity’s negotiated existence in this 
religious ecosystem would dramatically change after the eventual conversion of the Roman 
Emperor Constantine and the 313 Edict of Milan was signed to protect Christianity. The 
Christian faith was now thrust into the public space. Or was it the other way around? Could it 
be that Christianity received state support because of its potential for bringing unity to an 
ideologically diverse empire? Whatever the reason, this shift in political and religious 
realities enabled Christianity to develop a stronger public voice. Though this would be 
challenged at many points, a number of Christians throughout history have since articulated 
theological formulations for engagement in the public space. 
Within the ancient Chinese context, a similar struggle existed amongst the Hundred 
Schools of Thought (zhuzi baijia). Many of these so-called ‘schools’, including the School of 
Scholars (rujia or Confucianism), the School of the Way (daojia or Daoism), the School of 
Law (fajia or Legalism), the School of Mozi (Mojia or Moism), etc., spanned both 
sociopolitical and religiophilosophical concerns.3 However, by the Han dynasty (206 BCE–
                                                 
2 See José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 40–66. 
3 My use of the term ‘religiophilosophical’ suggests the challenge of clearly defining many of these 
traditions as ‘religions’ or ‘philosophies’ in the contemporary understandings of these labels. For 
instance, there is a fair bit of debate on whether Confucianism is a religion or a philosophy. Whilst 
220 CE), through the influence of thinkers like Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE), Confucianism 
became the state orthodoxy and was seen as having the potential to bring order to a diverse 
empire. Moreover, Confucianism was reformed to offer an even stronger understanding of its 
role in the public space. Competing ideological systems were sometimes tolerated and 
managed under the imperial-era Ministry of Ceremonies (taichang si) or Ministry of Rites (li 
bu)—ministries which some may see as having some parallels with today’s State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA).4 This tended to encourage a privatization of 
these alternative beliefs and practices. Like Christianity in the Holy Roman Empire, for two 
millennia, Confucianism had a preferred public voice in imperial China. This was particularly 
underscored by the imperial civil examination system, through which individuals who aspired 
to govern the society were educated in the Confucian classics to become scholar-officials. 
This book takes these two realities of Christianity and Confucianism together when 
looking at Chinese Christianity. The religiophilosophical legacy and sociopolitical context of 
                                                                                                                                                        
recognizing the complexity and importance of these debates, this current study will attempt to stay 
neutral on this matter. 
For some discussion on this debate, see Julia Ching, Chinese Religions (Marknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1993), 1–9; Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, ‘Introduction’, in Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of 
Modernity and State Formation, ed. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 2008), 11–34; Jason Ānanda Josephson, The Invention of Religion in Japan 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 1–17. 
4 See C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion 
and Some of their Historical Factors (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1961), 180–217; Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 17–23; Daniel H. Bays, ‘A Tradition of State Dominance’, in God and 
Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions, eds Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee 
Hamrin (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 25–39. 
China have been making a recognizable mark on the formation of Chinese Christianity. This 
rightly reflects the complexities of what is often termed contextual theology, whereby 
Christian thought is built on the resources of the bible, Christian tradition, and a particular 
context.5 In this study, I present the case that the recent history of Chinese Christianity has 
been developing a public faith that uses resources from both ‘foreign’ Christianity and 
‘indigenous’ Confucianism for public engagement.6 This integration of seemingly unrelated 
ideas to form a Chinese Christian public consciousness is not always explicit, but its 
influence is undeniable. Moreover, this book attempts to move beyond facile binary 
oppositions of public-private, sacred-secular, and thisworldly-otherworldly. These are 
                                                 
5 Stephen B. Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, rev. edn (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 
3–4. 
6 Christianity is often described as a ‘foreign religion’ or ‘foreign teaching’ (yangjiao) in China. This 
common label seems to contradict Christianity’s long history in China, reaching back to the 7th 
century, and the deeply embedded Chinese cultural priorities which shape Chinese Christianity as a 
Chinese religion. It was not until the 1850s that Christianity in China came under strong attack as a 
foreign religion—largely because of its association with imperialism during the Opium Wars. Since 
then, this characterization has stuck. 
Conversely, Confucianism is often described as a distinctive part of Chinese (or East Asian) culture. 
However, Arif Dirlik asks whether something as ‘Chinese’ as Confucianism can even be fully 
owned by those who see themselves as culturally Chinese. He writes, ‘It is interesting to 
contemplate when Confucius became Chinese, when he was rendered from a Zhou dynasty sage 
into one of the points of departure for a civilization conceived in national terms. When the 
Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese adopted Confucianism for their own purposes, all the time 
claiming their own separate identity, did they do so to become part of the Sung or Yuan or Ming, 
whom they resisted strenuously …?’ Arif Dirlik, ‘Timespace, Social Space, and the Question of 
Chinese Culture’, boundary 2 35, no. 1 (2008): 20. 
artificial constructs imposed on any religiophilosophical tradition and it is important to 
acknowledge the tension that exists between these antitheses. Ultimately, this book argues 
that Chinese Christianity needs an integrative theology which pursues a Divine-human unity 
as the foundation for the theologian and the church to engage the state and the society. 
THE GROWING PUBLIC NATURE OF CHINESE 
CHRISTIANITY 
Discussions about the public nature of religion inevitably lead into discussions about the 
‘public sphere’ or the ‘public square’. The former term originates in the writings of the 
German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas,7 whilst the latter term has been 
promoted by the American Lutheran-turned-Catholic scholar Richard John Neuhaus.8 Both 
formulations are products of the times and the contexts of their authors.9 The ‘public sphere’ 
was conceived in 1950s Germany when Habermas believed discursive spaces had been 
threatened; he wished to restore a voice to the bourgeoisie.10 In contrast, the ‘public square’ 
                                                 
7 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: Polity Press, [1962] 1989). 
8 Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984). 
9 See Nicholas Adams, ‘Interreligious Engagement in the Public Sphere’, in Understanding 
Interreligious Relations, eds David Cheetham, Douglas Pratt, and David Thomas (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 281–9. 
10 Much of the criticisms of this formulation are due to Habermas’ focus on a patriarchal bourgeoisie. 
See Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Rita 
Felski, Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change (Cambridge, MA: 
was birthed out of the United States in the 1980s, reflecting American democratic 
sensibilities; it involved the relationship between the church and the state, and the growing 
reality of secularism. 
Both of these formulations have their unique contextual idiosyncrasies that have been 
challenged from time to time; yet, neither of these terms were very important in discussions 
about China until the 1990s. Prior to this, Deng Xiaoping initiated a series of reforms to move 
beyond the Maoist dogmatism of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). This included a 
‘Movement to Liberate Thinking’ (sixiang jiefang yundong), which many have seen as 
paving the way towards a New or Second Chinese Enlightenment—the first being the May 
Fourth Movement or May Fourth Enlightenment of the early twentieth century.11 The 
intellectual ferment of the Second Chinese Enlightenment was complicated due to events 
leading to the 4 June 1989 clash in Tiananmen Square between military troops and student 
democracy protesters. Hence, the climate at the end of the 1980s was one that lent itself 
towards a reconsideration of the public voice of intellectuals. 
The year 1989 is important for more than one reason. In that year, Habermas’s 
monograph on the public sphere was translated into English.12 A number of Western scholars 
in Chinese history began to argue for the relevance of the term in the mainland Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                        
Harvard University Press, 1989); Nick Crossley and John M. Roberts, eds, After Habermas: New 
Perspectives on the Public Sphere (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
11 I discuss these two ‘enlightenments’ and their implications on Christianity in China in detail in 
Alexander Chow, Theosis, Sino-Christian Theology and the Second Chinese Enlightenment: 
Heaven and Humanity in Unity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 21–40. 
12 An earlier article on the subject was first translated into English in 1964, but did not seem to have 
much impact. Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article’, trans. Sara Lennox 
and Frank Lennox, New German Critique no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 49–55. 
context. For instance, William T. Rowe and Mary B. Rankin believe that, during late imperial 
and early Republican China, there was a growing use of the term ‘public’ (gong) in Chinese 
literature which suggested the emerging concept of the Chinese citizen.13 This public sphere, 
they argue, can ‘be distinguished from the state (guan) sphere of court and bureaucracy … 
[and] was also distinct from a private (si) realm of family, business, and property interests’.14 
Writings like this would result in a growing debate about a Chinese ‘public sphere’, and the 
closely related notion of a Chinese ‘civil society’, in both Anglophone and Sinophone 
                                                 
13 Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 
1865–1911 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); William T. Rowe, Hankow, Conflict 
and Community in a Chinese City, 1796–1895 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); 
William T. Rowe, ‘The Public Sphere in Modern China’, Modern China 16, no. 3 (July 1990): 
309–29; Mary Backus Rankin, ‘The Origins of a Chinese Public Sphere: Local Elites and 
Community Affairs in the Late Imperial Period’, Études chinoises 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1990): 13–60. 
For a contrasting approach, see Philip C. C. Huang, ‘“Public Sphere”/“Civil Society” in China? The 
Third Realm Between State and Society’, Modern China 19, no. 2 (April 1993): 216–40. 
14 Rankin, ‘The Origins of a Chinese Public Sphere’, 20. 
literature.15 Literature using the term ‘public square’ is much more sparse—but this is 
perhaps because of the Christian vantage point that Neuhaus was writing from.16 
Like any other theory born in one context and translated into another, there can be 
significant challenges with the wholesale application of the formulations of Habermas or 
Neuhaus into the Chinese situation. As such, this book will employ the alternative term of 
‘public space’, which has been suggested by Edward Gu and Merle Goldman to denote the 
fluid arena between the state and the family in China in which intellectuals and others attempt 
to engage.17 Regardless of the term used, the debates around the usefulness of categories such 
                                                 
15 See the special issue Modern China 19, no. 2 (April 1993). See also Chen Ruoshui, ‘Zhongguo lishi 
shang “gong” de guannian ji qi xiandai bianxing’ [Conceptions of Gong: A Typological and 
Holistic Approach to the Chinese Version of ‘Public’], in Gonggong xing yu gongmin guan [The 
Concept of ‘Public’ and Citizenship in Comparative Perspectives], ed. Xu Jilin (Nanjing: Jiangsu 
People’s Publishing, 2006), 3–39; Cao Weidong, ‘The Historical Effect of Habermas in the 
Chinese Context: A Case Study of the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’, Frontiers of 
Philosophy in China 1, no. 1 (January 2006): 41–50. 
16 Perhaps one of the notable exceptions to this is the 2014 publication of the Hong Kong theologian 
Lai Pan-chiu (Lai Pinchao), Guangchang shang de hanyu shenxue: Cong shenxue dao Jiduzongjiao 
yanjiu [Sino-Christian Theology in the Public Square: From Theology to Christian Studies] (Hong 
Kong: Dao Feng Shushe [Logos and Pneuma Press], 2014). 
17 Edward Gu and Merle Goldman, ‘Introduction’, in Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market, 
eds Merle Goldman and Edward Gu (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 9–10. See Merle Goldman, 
From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 16–17. 
This is also the practice of the editors of the special issue of the journal Logos and Pneuma: Chinese 
Journal of Theology no. 32 (Spring 2010), which was themed as ‘Hanyu shenxue yu gonggong 
kongjian’ [Sino-Christian Theology and Public Space]. 
as the public sphere, public square, or public space in China highlight the importance of this 
period in which Chinese intellectuals see the possibility of a stronger public voice—their 
stronger public voice in Chinese society. Hence, this book will attempt to highlight the public 
nature of Chinese Christianity as expressed by Christian intellectuals since the end of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
In Europe and North America, there has been a growing debate in the last few decades 
about the role of Christian intellectuals in the public space. The development of ‘public 
theology’ as a field of enquiry has resulted in a rapid growth of literature on the subject 
coming from a variety of Christian traditions—Catholic, Reformed, Anglican, Anabaptist, 
and many others. Some have suggested that a particular expression of public theology can 
have global currency.18 However, is this goal perhaps too ambitious? Like in the case of the 
formulations of the public sphere and the public square, the growing discourse about public 
theology needs to be contextually sensitive as well. Hence, through such initiatives as the 
‘Global Network for Public Theology’ and the International Journal of Public Theology, 
there is a growing awareness of more regionally specific understandings of Christianity’s 
public engagement.19 Furthermore, a seminal figure such as Max Stackhouse has tried to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Contrastingly, Timothy Cheek’s recent study on Chinese intellectuals unashamedly uses the language 
of the public sphere. See Timothy Cheek, The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
18 For example, see Deirdre K. Hainsworth and Scott R. Paeth, eds, Public Theology for a Global 
Society: Essays in Honor of Max Stackhouse (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010). 
19 Other examples include Felix Wilfred, Asian Public Theology: Critical Concerns in Challenging 
Times (Delhi: ISPCK, 2010); Sebastian Kim, Theology in the Public Sphere: Public Theology as a 
Catalyst for Open Debate (London: SCM Press, 2011), esp. Parts 2 and 3; Joseph Quayesi-
distinguish ‘public theology’ from ‘political theology’, suggesting that the former focuses on 
the civil society and the latter focuses on the power of the state.20 But this is a limited view 
which preferences Western discourse.21 The Chinese legal system, for instance, only offers 
‘freedom of religious belief’ (zongjiao xinyang ziyou)—a private matter—as opposed to 
‘freedom of religion’ (zongjiao ziyou).22 Hence, religious engagement with the civil society 
necessarily means religious engagement with political powers. Whilst my preference is to use 
the term ‘public theology’, both public theology and political theology are closely related 
fields of enquiry and are, in many ways, beneficial for the Chinese public discourse. 
This current study examines a specific regional expression of public theology, situated in 
mainland China following the death of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and the end of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–76). During the late 1970s, though many commentators believed 
Christianity in China was nearing its imminent death, Deng Xiaoping’s agenda to move 
beyond Maoist orthodoxy encouraged an openness that resulted in a ‘Christianity fever’ 
(Jidujiao re) prevailing across all sectors of Chinese society. In particular, this would have 
significant implications for the intellectual fervour associated with the Second Chinese 
Enlightenment. As already suggested, the events of 1989 did not bring an end to either 
dimension (that is, the Christianity fever or the Second Chinese Enlightenment) but allowed 
                                                                                                                                                        
Amakye, Christology and Evil in Ghana: Towards a Pentecostal Public Theology (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2013), esp. ch. 6. 
20 Max L. Stackhouse, ‘Civil Religion, Political Theology and Public Theology: What’s the 
Difference?’ Political Theology 5, no. 3 (2004): 275–93. See Kim, Theology in the Public Sphere, 
20–5. 
21 See Kwok Wai Luen, ‘Reconsidering Public Theology: Involvement of Hong Kong Protestant 
Christianity in the Occupy Central Movement’, Journal of Dharma 40, no. 2 (2015): 169–88. 
22 I am grateful to Mark McLeister for pointing out this important distinction to me. 
them to enter a new phase.23 Hence, the conditions of the three decades since the 1980s have 
enabled a growing sense of a Christian public voice. Partnered with this is the growing 
theological reflection on how Christians are able to engage with the society and the state. It 
would perhaps be an overstatement to describe all of this as an explicit attempt to craft a 
‘public theology’.24 It would moreover be incorrect to characterize all Chinese Christians as 
developing a stronger public voice, given the tendency of the vast majority of Chinese 
Christians to still focus on personal piety and on an explicitly disengaged relationship with 
the sociopolitical context. Rather, the Chinese Christian intellectuals examined in this study 
are part of this growing fervour in a Chinese public theology. 
GENERATIONAL SHIFTS 
This book looks at the public nature of mainland Chinese Christianity both historically and 
constructively. With regards to the first aspect, by no means do I attempt an exhaustive 
history. Instead, this study examines the growing public voice of Christianity in China since 
the late 1970s. There are earlier examples of how Chinese Christians have had strong public 
                                                 
23 This point about the Second Chinese Enlightenment has also been made by the historian and 
political liberal Xu Jilin, but contested by the new leftist Wang Hui. See Xu Jilin, ‘The Fate of an 
Enlightenment: Twenty Years in the Chinese Intellectual Sphere (1978–1998)’, in Chinese 
Intellectuals Between State and Market, 183–203; Wang Hui, ‘Contemporary Chinese Thought and 
the Question of Modernity’, trans. Rebecca E. Karl, Social Text 16, no. 2 ([1997] Summer 1998): 
9–44. 
24 The term itself is fairly new when referring to Christianity in China. In North America, Martin 
Marty first coined the term in 1974 in an attempt to distinguish it from Robert Bellah’s ‘civil 
religion’. Martin Marty, ‘Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Theology and the American Experience’, The 
Journal of Religion 54, no. 4 (October 1974): 332–59. 
consciousnesses, which we will briefly explore in Chapter 1. But, for reasons we have 
discussed, Chinese intellectuals in various periods after the Cultural Revolution have had a 
growing interest in exercising their public voice. It is therefore worthwhile to focus on key 
Chinese Christian intellectuals living and writing during this critical period to gain a better 
sense of the major themes expressed in the emerging Chinese public theology. 
Methodologically, a question can be raised about periodization. Some scholars have 
attempted to organize changes in intellectual history with the notion of paradigms and 
paradigm shifts. Related to the study of missions and world Christianity, David Bosch has 
written an influential text entitled Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of 
Mission.25 Bosch builds his understanding upon Hans Küng’s work on the history of 
Christian thought,26 and both base their approaches on the foundational work of Thomas 
Kuhn’s history of science.27 For each of these discussions, a crisis often results in a 
paradigmatic shift from an established mode of thinking to a new way of thinking. In his 
work on the history of science, Kuhn explains that ‘the solution to each [crisis] had been at 
least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in the corresponding 
science; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored.’28 Simply put, 
history repeats itself. For instance, this can be seen in the ways that the public voice of 
                                                 
25 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1991). 
26 Hans Küng, ‘Paradigm Change in Theology: A Proposal for Discussion’, in Paradigm Change in 
Theology: A Symposium for the Future, eds Hans Küng and David Tracy, trans. Margaret Köhl 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 3–33. See Bosch, Transforming Mission, 181–3. 
27 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 50th anniversary edn (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012). 
28 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 75. 
Chinese intellectuals today are partially anticipated by the traditional Confucian scholar-
officials. 
Whilst this is a useful periodization tool for many reasons, it would perhaps be 
problematic to think of post-Cultural Revolution China in terms of paradigms. Each of the 
above studies, for example, uses paradigms to show how one mode of thinking is affected by 
a crisis moment which results in a new mode of thinking that is mutually exclusive to its 
predecessor. In conversation with Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn develops his theory 
utilizing the notion of ‘incommensurability’ to explain what he sees as the fundamental 
incomprehensibility across various paradigms.29 In astronomy, for example, Kuhn speaks 
about the paradigm shift from the Ptolemaic system to the Copernican system, whereby the 
earth is no longer seen as the orbital centre of all celestial bodies.30 Küng and Bosch make 
similar remarks about the crisis of the Protestant Reformation in the historical trajectory of 
Western Christianity, whereby approaches to theology and missions necessarily shifted from 
a medieval Roman Catholic paradigm to a new Reformation-era paradigm.31 
The shifts that occur across paradigms are seemingly quite dramatic and the 
incommensurability of different paradigms can be questioned.32 Moreover, paradigms can 
perhaps only be spotted with a bird’s-eye view of a macro-level historical narrative. 
However, when we are dealing with a matter of a few decades, as in the current study, shifts 
                                                 
29 See Ian Hacking, ‘Introductory Essay’, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, xxx–xxxiii. 
30 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 68–70. 
31 Küng, ‘Paradigm Change in Theology’, 17–18; Bosch, Transforming Mission, 239. 
32 Much later, Kuhn responded to the many concerns levied against his use of the term ‘paradigm’ and 
called for a nuancing of the understanding. See Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Second Thoughts on 
Paradigms’, in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 293–319. 
in intellectual understandings do occur—but they are by no means ‘Copernican revolutions’, 
so to speak. Shifts have occurred during this era, but there is also a cumulative effect that is 
common across different periods. Moreover, individuals with the same shared experiences 
may interpret and react to those events quite differently. 
In this study, instead of paradigms and paradigm shifts, I employ the language of 
generations and generational shifts. A number of regional specialists have attempted to use a 
generational approach to their subject, but they have not developed much in terms of a 
theoretical framework.33 My interest, to a certain extent, is informed by the sociological 
theory of generations, which is often traced back to Karl Mannheim’s seminal work ‘The 
Problem of Generations’.34 For Mannheim, generations are not understood in terms of kinship 
relationships, in which a parent and a child are necessarily of two generations. Instead, 
individuals are related to one another within a generational unit due to certain shared 
                                                 
33 For some examples, see Yasuo Furuya, ed., A History of Japanese Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1997); He Guanghu, ‘Three Generations of Chinese Christianity Researchers: From the 
1950s to 2007’, in China and Christianity: A New Phase of Encounter?, eds Felix Wilfred, 
Edmond Tang, and Georg Evers (London: SCM Press, 2008), 58–70; Volter Küster, A Protestant 
Theology of Passion: Korean Minjung Theology Revisited (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 131–49; Paul 
Kollman, ‘Classifying African Christianities: Past, Present, and Future: Part One’, Journal of 
Religion in Africa 40, no. 1 (March 2010): 3–32; Paul Kollman, ‘Classifying African Christianities, 
Part Two: The Anthropology of Christianity and Generations of African Christians’, Journal of 
Religion in Africa 40, no. 2 (May 2010): 118–48. 
34 Karl Mannheim, ‘The Problem of Generations’, in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul 
Kecskemeti (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 276–322. For a good history on the 
sociology of generations, see June Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner, ‘Introduction’, in Generational 
Consciousness, Narrative, and Politics, eds June Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner (Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 1–7. 
experiences of historical events, what he calls a ‘social location’.35 This develops into 
common generational consciousness which stratifies the experiences of one generation as 
opposed to another generation. Some sociologists, including Mannheim, speak about 
generations in terms of an age cohort36—that is, individuals born within a certain time frame 
and who came of age together, such as the ‘Baby Boom generation’ or ‘Generation X’. 
Others define a generational unit more loosely, including people of varying ages who have 
had a collective response to historical events which are often traumatic, such as the two 
World Wars or 9/11. These events distinguish one generation from another.37 
A theory of generations understood in this second sense is a useful heuristic device in 
organizing discussions about China—a country which, over the last century, has been shaped 
by a number of significant events: two World Wars, a civil war, two enlightenments, the 
Cultural Revolution, the military clash with student protesters in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 
1989, and the country’s ascent in the global economy. This present study, focused on the 
period following the Cultural Revolution, shows that various individuals have arisen as 
prominent spokespersons of Christianity in the Chinese public space. These decades have not 
witnessed a continuous flow of prominent individuals, but several distinct groups have 
formed—generations which have arisen at and as a result of kairos moments such as the 
Cultural Revolution and the 1989 clash in Tiananmen Square. Different generations may 
                                                 
35 Mannheim, ‘The Problem of Generations’, 288–90, 297–9. 
36 See Norman B. Ryder, ‘Notes on the Concept of a Population’, American Journal of Sociology 69, 
no. 5 (Mar. 1964): 447–63; Norman B. Ryder, ‘The Cohort as a Concept in Social Change’, 
American Sociological Review 30, no. 6 (Dec. 1965): 843–61; Larry J. Griffin, ‘“Generations and 
Collective Memory” Revisited: Race, Region, and Memory of Civil Rights’, American 
Sociological Review 69, no. 4 (Aug. 2004): 544–57. 
37 Edmunds and Turner, ‘Introduction’, 6–7. 
have an overlap in experiences, but each generation has its own nuanced relationships with 
these historical events which tend to transcend regional differences (between Beijing and 
Shanghai and Chengdu) because of their common generational consciousness. These 
contextual factors of China’s complex history have shaped the growing public nature of 
Chinese Christianity as seen through different theological and identity formulations. 
CONFUCIAN IMAGINATION 
A second methodological concern deals with the encounters between religiophilosophical 
traditions which result in multiple levels of conflict, conquest, and collaboration. Generally 
speaking, countries in Asia have tended to maintain a strong sense of religiosity. However, 
there are not many regions of Asia that enjoy a Christian majority population. The Sri Lankan 
theologian Aloysius Pieris explains this in what he calls homo religiosus—the idea that 
humans are fundamentally religious. This psychological posture is often seen in terms of 
‘“cosmic religion” … the species of religion that is found in Africa, Asia, and Oceania, and 
has been pejoratively referred to as “animism” by certain Western authors’.38 However, due 
to sociopolitical change and technocratic advancements, new ‘cosmic religions’ such as 
Marxism and democracy have found prominence in the cosmic order.39 Yet Pieris explains 
that, in Asia, cosmic religions have ‘practically been domesticated and integrated into one or 
the other of the three metacosmic soteriologies—namely, Hinduism, Buddhism, and to some 
extent Taoism’.40 In other words, religions that are transcendent and soteriological have been 
built upon and taken over religions that are immanent and naturalistic. In Africa and Oceania, 
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the metacosmic soteriologies of Christianity and Islam have found many converts. 
Contrastingly, in much of Asia, where other metacosmic religions have been dominant, 
Christianity has been unable to compete or to make much headway. 
This explanation of the conflicts that exist between various Asian metacosmic religions 
makes sense in Pieris’s native Sri Lanka in which Christianity is strongly opposed by the 
dominant and, sometimes, violent forms of Sinhalese Buddhism. When Pieris speaks about 
China, he rightly describes Confucianism as a cosmic religion. However, his more generic 
explanation of the prevalence of metacosmic religions is highly contestable within the 
Chinese context. Whilst he offers a useful categorization of the Asian context as having 
cosmic and metacosmic religions, his explanation of the tensions that exist between various 
religions is perhaps more appropriate for South Asia than East Asia. 
The Ghanaian theologian Kwame Bediako, taking Pieris’s views as a starting point, 
suggests that this relationship between cosmic and metacosmic religions in Asia confirms 
‘the historical connections between Christianity and primal religion’ found more globally.41 
Bediako does not engage Pieris’s discussion of metacosmic soteriologies or insistence on 
their historical absence in Africa and Oceania. But this is undoubtedly because, in contrast 
with Pieris, Bediako is less concerned with the competition of metacosmic soteriologies as he 
is interested in Christianity’s dominance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Instead of ‘cosmic religions’, Bediako prefers to speak of ‘primal religions’—a term 
coined by Harold Turner and Andrew Walls as an alternative to the older term ‘primitive 
religions’. Turner and Walls believe that ‘primal religions’ offers a less pejorative alternative 
in order to more usefully understand religious expressions of indigenous peoples alongside 
‘world religions’ such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. However, some scholars of 
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religious studies have not been so receptive. James Cox, a former student of Walls, has 
criticized ‘primal religions’ as ‘a non-empirical term that had proved extremely useful for 
inserting Christian assumptions into the study of Indigenous Religions’.42 Cox sees 
‘indigenous religions’ as offering greater clarity in classifying religions, without imposing 
any sense of a preparatio evangelica.43 Yet, Walls explains: 
Suffice it to say that the word ‘primal’ is not a euphemism for ‘primitive’, nor 
are any evolutionary undertones intended. The word helpfully underlines two 
features of the religions of the peoples indicated: their historical anteriority 
and their basic, elemental status in human experience. All other faiths are 
subsequent, and represent, as it were, second thoughts; all other believers, and 
for that matter non-believers, are primalists underneath.44 
Contrary to Cox’s claims about him, Walls does not wish to speak of an evolutionary process 
of primal religions being fulfilled by the Christian gospel. Instead, he hopes to find a term 
which helpfully shows how individuals and communities respond to encounters with different 
religions by grafting onto pre-existing dispositions. This is why he describes primal religions 
as having a ‘historical anteriority’. In some ways, this highlights parallels with Pieris’s 
approach which sees cosmic religions as being a foundation for metacosmic soteriologies. 
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However, as Walls clarifies later in the same essay, primal religions respond to such 
encounters in different ways—such as restatement, adjustment, and revitalization.45 Hence, it 
perhaps would have been better nuanced if Walls described primal religions as having both 
anterior and posterior possibilities. 
Walls’s concern, which indeed is quite different from Cox’s, is to speak about the result 
of encounters between different religions rather than to speak about a taxonomy—that is, a 
scheme for classifying different religions. Indeed, both Walls’s term ‘primal’ and Cox’s term 
‘indigenous’ are imperfect. Both are meant to represent religions which are contrasted with 
‘world religions’—those religions which some might depict as being more civilized, more 
developed, and more universal.46 
Despite these concerns, Kwame Bediako finds ‘primal religions’ as a useful motif to 
understand African Christianity and in the rediscovery of the ‘primal imagination’ found deep 
within.47 This makes sense in the development of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa, in 
which there is sufficient evidence of developments from African primal religions, as anterior, 
to African Christianity, as posterior. Likewise, Aloysius Pieris’s context offers sufficient 
evidence of developments from Asian cosmic religions, as anterior, to Asian metacosmic 
soteriologies, as posterior. 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 267–78. 
46 A number of works have spent much more time dealing with the academic discourse related to what 
constitutes a ‘world religions’ and its relationship with other ‘religions’. See Cox, From Primitive 
to Indigenous, 33–52; Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions; or, How European 
Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005). 
47 Bediako, Christianity in Africa, 91–108. 
China differs from both Africa and Sri Lanka. That which one may term as a cosmic 
religion or a primal religion quite readily serves more than an anterior role. This is 
undoubtedly true throughout the history of religions in China. For instance, we may consider 
the developments of the so-called ‘three teachings’ (sanjiao) of Confucianism, Daoism, and 
Buddhism. Whilst these teachings were in many ways rivals, there was also a burgeoning 
discourse around the harmonization of the three teachings (sanjiao heyi) beginning as early as 
the fourth century CE.48 Each tradition was seen as offering a different route towards the same 
destination (shutu tonggui)—or, to put it idiomatically, all roads lead to Rome. There was 
therefore a significant amount of borrowing and transformation of ideas—in anterior, 
posterior, or even medial positions—across the porous borders which identify each school of 
thought.49 
My concern here is how Chinese religiosity and its possible modes of existence affect the 
Chinese Christian framework of thinking.50 For instance, it has become common to speak of a 
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Pentecostalization of Chinese Christianity since the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, 
some scholars dispute this idea and see it more as a folk religionization of Chinese 
Christianity which emphasizes an immediate and practical modality of religious experience.51 
In terms of this book’s main focus, it is worth focusing on how Confucian understandings 
have influenced Chinese Christian intellectuals. This is noticeable in a discursive modality of 
religious experience, which ‘requires a high level of literacy and a penchant for philosophical 
and “theological” thinking’.52 Undoubtedly, many Chinese Christians would deny these 
connections. But it seems apparent that aspects of Confucianism are interwoven with 
manifold layers, forming a stratified whole representing some of what we may call Chinese 
Christianity53 and, moreover, some of what we may call Chinese public theology. To adapt 
Bediako, a ‘Confucian imagination’ can be noticed in certain aspects of Chinese 
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Christianity.54 Whilst other ‘imaginations’ can be identified with Daoism and Buddhism and 
Maoism, the emphasis in this book will be on the Confucian imagination. My interest is less 
on what Confucianism is, as such,55 but the direct or indirect influence of figures and writings 
which are generally associated with this tradition. This focus is due to the dominant role that 
Confucianism has historically played in the Chinese public space—particularly as the state 
orthodoxy—which has offered various dynamics for the historical development of Chinese 
public theology. Methodologically, this book hopes to uncover some of these qualities and to 
offer a constructive theological engagement with the Confucian imagination. 
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This study has two main parts. The first part, encompassing four chapters, will focus on the 
growing public voice of Christianity in China. Chapter 1 will begin by situating this 
conversation in a Chinese tradition of public intellectualism. Like other things, the Chinese 
rendering of ‘public intellectual’ (gonggong zhishifenzi) is a recent invention. However, this 
chapter follows Tu Weiming’s (b. 1940) argument that China has had a long history of what 
can be described as public intellectualism—pre-dating the coinage of the term and the 
Western debates around the subject.56 Indeed, China has long engendered a Confucian 
tradition in which one is educated—not merely for intellectual gain, but also to be a scholar-
official who would shape the running of the state and the society. This chapter will briefly 
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look at that theme in imperial China, but also the shifts afforded after the end of the imperial 
civil examination system in 1905 and the various events of the twentieth century. It will 
explore early examples of how Chinese Christian intellectuals can be perceived as public 
intellectuals and it will discuss the different courses that Protestants in China took in contrast 
to Catholic or Orthodox Christians, thereby providing them with greater opportunities in the 
post-Cultural Revolution era to exercise a public voice. To guide some of this and later 
discussions, I will employ the approach of David Tracy who has argued that Christian 
thinkers have historically addressed three distinct but related ‘publics’: the society, the 
academy, and the church.57 
Chapters 2 to 4 will explore the growing public voice of Chinese Christianity since the 
1980s. Each of these chapters will focus on one of three major generations and how they 
engaged the various publics in their own respective ways. Chapter 2 will discuss the leaders 
of the reinstated Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the newly formed China 
Christian Council (CCC), known together as the lianghui (‘two associations’), and their 
initiatives as Christian intellectuals since the early 1980s.58 During this period, the state-
sanctioned TSPM and CCC are seen as the only means in which Protestantism could viably 
engage the state and the society. Such an opportunity was not wasted by leaders of the 
lianghui. This chapter will focus much attention on the writings and the actions of Bishop K. 
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H. Ting (Ding Guangxun, 1915–2012), the pre-eminent leader of state-sanctioned 
Protestantism during this time. Whilst Ting is often considered a theological liberal and a 
stooge for the communist government, this chapter will show that much of his theological 
engagement has a strong basis in his background in Anglican social theology. This chapter 
will also briefly look at the views of like-minded individuals such as Chen Zemin (b. 1917) 
and Shen Yifan (1928–94), before spending a bit more time with the evangelical Wang 
Weifan (1927–2015), the latter of whom was labelled a ‘rightist’ during the 1950s and, in the 
1990s, attacked by Ting himself. These individuals are part of a generation of Christian 
leaders who were affiliated with the newly formed TSPM in the 1950s and 1960s, lived 
through the Cultural Revolution, and became some of the key leadership of the reinstituted 
TSPM and the newly formed CCC in the 1980s. 
Chapter 3 will focus on a younger generation of Christian intellectuals born in the 1950s 
and having spent their formative years experiencing the Cultural Revolution firsthand. This 
chapter will examine the unique development beginning in the late 1980s when a number of 
Chinese academics looked towards Christian theology as a way to facilitate the search for 
modern China—many of whom found no value in being part of a local faith community. This 
chapter draws on the rise of Sino-Christian theology or Sino-Christian studies and focuses on 
two of the most important ‘cultural Christians’ (wenhua Jidutu),59 Liu Xiaofeng (b. 1956) and 
He Guanghu (b. 1950). Liu was initially drawn to the theology of Karl Barth, but later turns 
towards the political philosophy of Leo Strauss and attacks political liberalism whilst 
embracing new leftism. In contrast, He Guanghu’s thinking has been informed by the 
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writings of Paul Tillich and John Hick. He Guanghu would later be one of the signatories of 
the human rights manifesto Charter 08 and the Oxford Consensus in 2013. This chapter will 
also look at other cultural Christians who have focused on questions around the Second 
Chinese Enlightenment’s relationship with Christian culture, modernity, and secularization. 
Some have questioned whether these individuals can be considered ‘Christian’ or if their 
writings can be considered ‘theology’, since they are not known to actively participate in the 
life of any local Chinese church. However, this chapter will discuss the ways this ambivalent 
relationship with the church highlights one of the dimensions of how cultural Christians have 
seen themselves and the place of religion in shaping the future of Chinese society. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the development in the late 1990s and the early twenty-first 
century of intellectuals in the study of Christianity with a stronger faith commitment than 
their predecessors discussed in Chapter 3. Whilst many of these individuals would initially 
see themselves as being cultural Christians, they would later shift and see themselves as 
Christian scholars (Jidutu xueren)60 who serve as elders and pastors of local urban intellectual 
churches and develop their theological engagements based on the Calvinist tradition. 
Moreover, in contrast to the cultural Christians who spent most of their more formative years 
during the Cultural Revolution, this new generation of Christian intellectuals was born 
towards the end of the Cultural Revolution and was often more shaped by—and may even 
have been part of—the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. They would be affected by the 
changes that have come out of China’s rise in the global market and the rapid urbanization 
experienced throughout the country. This chapter will first focus on Christian human rights 
activists such as Wang Yi (b. 1973) and Yu Jie (b. 1973) who argue for a stronger 
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understanding of constitutionalism based on covenantal theology, each of whom would self-
identify as political liberals. The chapter will secondly discuss other Christian intellectuals, 
Sun Yi (b. 1961) and Jin Tianming (b. 1968), who employ the teachings of John Calvin and 
Dutch Neo-Calvinists to develop a theology of constructive dialogue with the state and the 
society.61 This chapter will highlight the latest phase in the growing public voice of Chinese 
Christian intellectuals. 
After looking at the historical shape of Chinese Christianity’s growing public 
consciousness, we will turn to the second part of the book in which I will offer suggestions 
for possible routes in the development of a Chinese public theology. Chapter 5 will look at 
how these Christian public theologians compare with other public intellectuals of this period. 
Because of its significance for our period, this chapter will also try to tease out some of the 
details of the different intellectual factions that have formed since the late 1990s, paying 
particular attention to the two major political groupings of ‘new left’ (xin zuo pai) and 
‘liberalism’ (ziyou zhuyi).62 Whilst the revived interests in Confucianism and Christianity are 
sometimes considered two other factions during this time, this chapter will show how the four 
schools have much more porous boundaries than is often recognized. The chapter will further 
show how a ‘Confucian imagination’ shapes various developments in contemporary China, 
whether this be public intellectualism, generally, or Chinese Christianity, specifically. 
                                                 
61 As we will discuss in Chapter 4, there is a significant difference between ‘Neo-Calvinism’ (which 
begins in the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century) and ‘New Calvinism’ (a late twentieth-
century American phenomenon). 
62 The Chinese and English terms for ‘liberalism’ (ziyou zhuyi) are generic and can apply to political 
liberalism or theological liberalism. I have endeavoured to clarify which form of liberalism is being 
discussed, at times with an added adjective of ‘political’ or ‘theological’. 
The final two constructive chapters will explore how the Confucian imagination also 
offers a unique tendency in Chinese public theology to prioritize questions related to 
transcendence and ecclesiology. Building on my previous work on the Eastern Orthodox 
understanding of theosis and the Chinese understanding of the unity of Heaven and humanity 
(Tian ren heyi),63 Chapter 6 will engage Aristotle Papanikolaou’s recent work on political 
theology and argue the case for Chinese Christianity to have an integrative theology which 
pursues a Divine-human unity as the foundation for the theologian and the church to engage 
the state and the society.64 Chapter 7 will underscore the important place of ecclesiology in 
the formation of a Chinese public theology. I argue that the contemporary Chinese church has 
become a surrogate for the Chinese family. As such, this offers unique strengths and 
challenges for Chinese public theology, which can be further developed with a 
reconsideration of certain aspects of Confucianism and Christianity—mindful of the 
theological understandings of personhood, the Trinity, and ecclesiology, as offered by the 
seminal thinking of John Zizioulas.65 
By way of conclusion, Chapter 8 will step back and tease out the broader significance of 
Chinese public theology to the growing discourse of public theology inside and outside 
China. 
PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND MAINLAND CHINA 
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This is the first major study of its kind on Chinese public theology. Scholars have begun to 
explore the public nature of religion in China66 and the public nature of the narrow field of 
Sino-Christian theology.67 However, most studies do not address the role of state-sanctioned 
Protestant Christianity in the 1980s and the early 1990s alongside the developments of Sino-
Christian theology and urban intellectual Christianity today. This is understandable given the 
amount of academic output produced by the enterprise of Sino-Christian theology and the 
recent international news media coverage of urban Christianity. There is perhaps also a 
tendency for certain individuals to downplay or disregard the value and the significance of 
the TSPM and the CCC. I attempt to correct this oversight and show the important 
contributions made by leaders of state-sanctioned Protestant Christianity that, in many ways, 
prepared the way for later generations. Moreover, I portray a bigger picture of the trajectory 
of Chinese public theology, which is shaped by the various currents of Chinese Christian 
intellectuals and the overall tradition of Chinese public theology. 
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From a very different perspective, this is also a study about Chinese intellectual history. 
Much of the literature in this space tends to focus on non-religious sources of intellectual 
history. Just as Hu Shih has described the May Fourth period as the Chinese Renaissance,68 
Samuel Ling has attempted to highlight the Christian voices of that movement in his Ph.D. 
dissertation entitled ‘The Other May Fourth Movement: The Chinese “Christian 
Renaissance”, 1919–1937’.69 For the Second Chinese Enlightenment, scholars such as Merle 
Goldman and Timothy Cheek have written important studies on the developments of Chinese 
intellectualism, whilst tending to downplay the Confucian voices and largely ignoring the 
Christian voices of this period.70 This book attempts to address this significant oversight. 
This study employs two new methodological approaches. Whilst the notion of paradigm 
shifts has been useful in many situations, this book itself is a case study which highlights the 
benefits of a generational approach to periodization which takes into account factors that 
influence multiple generational units across different historical events. It will highlight the 
continuities and discontinuities in the Christian public voice and provide a means to identify 
key themes that arise from and are shared across each generation. Secondly, this book argues 
a case for the Confucian imagination in Chinese public theology. This suggests that other 
‘imaginations’ may exist—in China or elsewhere—which help to bring shape to contextual 
theologies. 
In fact, this book underscores the fluidity of any contextual expression of public theology 
and, in this case, the negotiations between Christian and Chinese ideological resources. It also 
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demonstrates how this region, with perhaps the fastest growing Christian population in the 
world today, negotiates its existence and attempts to create its own public faith within the 
complex and tense sociopolitical context of contemporary China. 
Finally, this book develops from my earlier work on the Eastern Orthodox theme of 
theosis and the Chinese traditional theme of the unity of Heaven and humanity, in so much as 
it draws out the public religious implications of a Divine–human unity. 
